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Introduction: The military revolution 
When Prussia won the wars against Austria in 1866 and France in 
1870-71, she surprised the world. An army that had not fought a major 
war since Waterloo (and had been a minor ally even then), an army that 
was much more renowned for its pedantic drill and its obsession with 
drums and bugles than for its fighting prowess had overthrown the 
two leading military powers of continental Europe.' A hectic search for 
explanations began to preoccupy the military leadership not only of the 
defeated nations, but of all the powers. Prussia's army became the 
envy of the world; it seemed to hold the master key for victory. Soon 
the other armed forces began to imitate every detail of its army struc-
ture that seemed characteristically Prussian in nature, hoping to acquire 
that master key.2 Universal conscription along Prussian lines was 
introduced in Austria, France, Italy, Russia and many other countries-
among them Norway in 1876. General staffs were reorganized in order 
to conform to the Prussian blueprint, the bureaucratic organization that 
had so brilliantly led King William 's armies to victory under Helmuth 
von Moltke. Parliaments approved of the enormous expenditure neces-
sary to provide hundreds of thousands of infantrymen with rapid-firing 
breechloaders like the Prussian needle-gun or the even more dreadful 
chassepot the French army had introduced after Prussia's victory in 
1866.3 National military traditions counted for nothing against the 
desire to make armies look as Prussian as possible. In 1881, the United 
States even equipped its soldiers with the Pickelhaube (the spiked 
helmet).' 
For decades Europe had been used to disregard Prussia's army as a 
second-rate force commanded by Frederician septuagenarians and 
hampered by financial restraints. It sure did look beautiful on the 
parade-ground and if other armies had doubts about details of formal 
drill or uniform design, they confidently turned to Prussia for advice.' 
As a fighting force, however, the Army of Frederick William Ill and IV 
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was held in low esteem. When it went to war in June 1866 one of the 
finest military writers of the time, Friedrich En gels, predicted a crush-
ing defeat at the hands of Austria's whitecoats. He dismissed the 
Prussian army's organization, its tactics and its leadership as clearly 
inferior. Engels also ridiculed Prussia's war plan as a guarantee to fail 
in any officers exam. 6 That war plan, of course, was devised by 
Helmuth von Moltke, and was soon after described as the work of a 
genius. 
When Prussia 's bluecoats crushed the largest and finest army the 
Habsburg empire had ever fielded within six weeks, Engels had a 
difficult time explaining why they had fought so well. So had others 
who had predicted defeat. Either everyone who had looked down upon 
Prussia 's peacetime army since 1815 had been awfully wrong all the 
time-m some change had gone unnoticed, most likely shortly before 
the war. Then something came to mind: Had not the Prussian minister 
ofwar,Albrecht von Roon, been fighting a liberal parliament over army 
reform for the last six years? Had not the conservative Junker Otto 
von Bismarck been brought to the helm in order to squeeze the funds 
for that reform out of the representatives? Did not King William deem 
that very measure so terribly important that he had rather accepted the 
deadlock of the political system (which history now knows as the 
"constitutional conflict") than give way to the opposition's critics?' 
Could not the one have something to do with the other, army reform in 
1860 and victory in 1866? It was possible, nay: it was obvious. The 
explanation was found. 
This explanation suited also Prussia's political and military leader-
ship. The liberal opposition had always doubted that the reorganization 
of the army was worth the nine million Thai er increase in annual 
military spending Roon had devised. However, this reorganized army 
had defeated Prussia 's old German rival with astonishing success. How 
easy now to bypass the opposition's stronghold! Not only had the 
liberals tried to withhold from Prussia 's victorious army the money it 
had needed so dearly. The triumph of the army also seemed to prove 
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without the slightest doubt that the reorganization had been a necessity. 
History itself had defeated the opposition. The stubborn king's refusal 
to compromise was re-styled as admirable steadfastness that had 
saved the country from disaster.' The new twist in military politics met 
with considerable success. Shortly after the war the constitutional 
conflict was settled and army expenditure of the last six years belatedly 
approved by parliament. 
The army reform of 1860 went down in history as a secular break, 
as a "glorious restoration of the army."' For the Wilhelminians that was 
enough of an explanation. 20'' century historiography, however, did not 
accept so easily that 30--odd additional regiments and some shifting of 
age cohorts (for this is what the "reorganization" was all about) had 
made William's army next to invincible. There had to be something 
more, and it was found. Since the Second Empire passed away, mili-
tary historians have increasingly assumed that a whole cluster of 
reform measures was implemented in Prussia in the few years before 
the war of 1866, of which the reorganization was only the core ele-
ment. The rise of Moltke's general staff, the introduction of the nee-
dle-gun, the beginning of the military use of railways and telegraphs, 
reforms in military education, in strategy and tactics and many a thing 
more were newly interpreted as constituent parts of a great push in 
military innovation.•• At least one writer insists that what happened in 
Prussia between 1858 and 1866 was nothing less than a full-scale 
military revolution.'' 
This article seeks to explore the validity of this concept of a military 
revolution. I investigate the specific speed of military innovation in 
Prussia between the great army reforms of 1807 to 1813 and the 
immediate aftermath of the Franco-German War, that is, the 1870s. 
First I turn to the organizational aspects of the military system, i.e. 
universal conscription and army organization. Second I look at the 
general staff, third, the use the army made of technical innovations 
such as the railway and the needle gun (to which I turn in part IV), 
and, fifth, at tactical reforms. After a short conclusion, I will offer 
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some hypotheses on the recurrent myths about Prussia 's "military 
revolution." 
1. Universal conscription and the conflict over the 
Landwehr 
The army that Frederick William Ill had inherited from his great uncle, 
Frederick 11, was. composed half of foreign mercenaries and half of 
conscripted East Elbian peasants. In 1806/1807, it crumbled under the 
onslaughts of Napoleon's grande armee. 51 of the 60 regiments of 
infantry, most of which had looked back on a continuous existence of 
over a century, dissolved or went into captivity, never again to be 
rebuilt. The king had to accept a humiliating peace treaty and was 
turned into a French satellite. Burdened by astronomic contributions to 
France, its territory reduced by half, Prussia had to start from scratch. 
The army reformers, Gerhard von Scharnhorst and August Graf 
Neidhart von Gneisenau, managed not only to rebuild a small part of 
the old army on a national basis, that is: minus the foreigners. Against 
the opposition of many conservative politicians and with the lukewarm 
support of the king, they also established the principle that every 
citizen was liable for compulsory military service. Artisans, merchants, 
teachers, university students, and town-dwellers in general, who had 
hitherto been exempted from military service, now were called to the 
colours where they merged with the East Elbian serfs they used to 
despise. A national army of universal conscription was born. In the 
wars of 1813-14, six per cent of Prussia 's population fought for. 
liberation, a remarkably high proportion even by 19'' century stand-
ards." 
Yet the king's advisors thought they had to offer the bourgeois 
something for his compliance to serve. While the dust settled on the 
battlefields of Northern France in 1814, a new service law was passed 
that upheld the principle of universal conscription. But it contained a 
loophole for the wealthy citizen's sons. Not only had they to serve only 
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one year instead of the usual three and were hence called Einjtihrig-
Freiwillige ("one-year volunteers"). Moreover, the king placed a full 
half of the field army, the bulk of the older age cohorts, under bour-
geois officers. Under the service law of 1814, the ordinary recruit 
spent three years with the colours and two more with the reserve. For 
the rest of his 19-year service period, he belonged to the Landwehr 
(literally "country defence", usually translated as "militia"). The 
Landwehr was to be officered primarily by the Einjtihrig-Freiwilligen, 
but was placed under inspectors who were regular officers. It was 
concentrated for four weeks a year in peacetime. In war, field brigades 
were formed from a regular and a Landwehr regiment each." 
The system thus established was based on the idea of "separate, but 
equal." In fact, the Landwehr was more a war-time reserve of the 
standing army than a true militia. On paper, it was constructed as a 
parallel universe for the bourgeois officer, where he might enjoy nearly 
the same privileges as his aristocratic colleague in the standing army. 
The rationale was to draw the citizens closer to the army of universal 
conscription, yet not so close that they might feel unduly constricted. 
Meanwhile the regular army was supposed to be kept an intact pillar of 
the throne as in Frederick's times, untampered by liberal thoughts of 
social reform. 
The scheme did not work out the way it was intended. The regular 
officers kept looking down upon their Landwehr colleagues as inferiors 
both in terms of their social background and their lack of proper 
military training. The one-year volunteers, in turn, were unable to 
acquire much actual social emancipation through their service as 
Landwehr officers. Soon the supply of officer candidates could no 
longer keep up with the demand. Regulars had to be seconded to the 
Landwehr in order to fill vacancies, in turn dangerously weakening the 
line itself. 
For most officers of the standing army the Landwehr was a nui-
sance. It lacked everything necessary for proper military training, most 
of all professional officers and regular soldiers who could act as a 
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skeleton for the masses of half-civilian reservists. Yet Prussia could 
not do without the Landwehr. For forty years after Waterloo, the 
Hohenzollern state was overburdened by the enormous debts accumu-
lated during the French occupation and the Wars of Liberation. Replac-
ing 176,000 Landwehr men with regulars would have meant more than 
doubling the line, necessitating an expenditure on officers, barracks 
and equipment Prussia could not even dream of. Abolishing the 
Landwehr and making do with the 140,000 troops of the line would 
have been synonymous to abandoning Prussia 's great power status. 
Thus the Landwehr was indispensable for the time being. 
Most officers of the line, however, were not convinced of the need 
to uphold the character of the Landwehr as a parallel universe. Their 
credo was breaking its autonomous structure and bringing it under 
closer control of the standing army already in peacetime. Still, money 
was the central problem. On the one hand, the Landwehr was continu-
ally weakened due to financial restraints. In the permanent competition 
for funds the line was always the winner, and the Landwehr deterio-
rated due to ever shrinking training periods. The exercises for the so-
called second ltivy, the oldest age-group, were abolished altogether. On 
the other hand, the desolate state of Prussia's finances was the strong-
est protection for the Landwehr, since any drastic reform of the 
system would have required a considerable increase in military spend-
ing. 
Accordingly, it took over 40 years to bring the Landwehr under full 
control of the line. In 1819, its peacetime structure was beheaded 
when it lost its autonomous inspectors in favour of brigade command-
ers who were placed under the command of the line divisions. During 
the 1830s, the line's grip on the Landwehr was fastened when more 
regular officers were seconded to the Landwehr, while Landwehr 
officers were called to the colours of the line regiments for exercises. 
The Landwehr brigades were abolished in 1852. Now a line and a 
Landwehr regiment formed a brigade already in peacetime. Simultane-
ously, the last Landwehr company commanders were replaced by 
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regulars. The Landwehr cavalry was completely integrated into the 
line. When the first plans for the so-called reform of 1859/60 were 
drafted, the parallel universe had long since disappeared. The 
Landwehr in all but its name had become the wartime reserve of the 
standing army. 14 
Yet numerically nothing had changed. If Prussia's army should ever 
take the field, half of the infantry would still be composed of Landwehr 
men, veterans who had lived a civilian life for anything between two 
and nine years. But in the late I 850s this was no longer a fact to be 
accepted with bad grace. After three decades, Prussia had finally been 
able to throw off the strangling grip of its national debts. While the 
successful customs union with most of northern Germany yielded a 
growing income from customs duties, the beginning of the industrial 
take-off filled the treasury with ever increasing indirect taxes. Finally, 
Prussia could do without the Landwehr. During I 857 and 1858, the 
war ministry worked out the plans. All Landwehr infantry regiments 
were to be replaced by new regiments of the line. Landwehr cavalry 
was to be completely disbanded. Annual recruiting was to rise from 
40.000 to 63.000. In future, Prussia's field army would be composed 
entirely of regulars. The Landwehr would be used for garrison duty 
only. 15 
The liberals bitterly resented that prospect. Theirs leaders confessed 
to be "attached to the Landwehr with religious fanaticism" 16 and that 
fanaticism fuelled the constitutional conflict. 17 They need not have 
worried. Modern warfare had already outrun Prussia 's desire to care-
fully select whom to put in the field in case of war. The mid-19'' 
century was the dawn of the age of mass armies, and war departments 
had to make count every man who could fire a rifle. King William's 
armies numbered 660,000 in I 866 and 1.2 Million in I 870, a far cry 
from the 300,000 the combined line and Landwehr had counted in the 
1850s.18 But reserve and Landwehr fought side by side with the regu-
lars in both wars. The so--called reform had hardly changed the char-
acter and composition of the army; instead it had nearly doubled its 
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size. Little Prussia now could play in the champion's league among the 
great powers. That was the historic significance of 1860. 
In the long run, however, Prussia had opened a Pandora's box. In 
order to field armies approximately the size as those of her neighbours, 
she had to recruit a full 40 per cent of all men of military age when the 
other powers were content with about 25 per cent. What should keep 
them from doing the same in order to outnumber Prussia-Germany 
again? Nothing did, and thus the age of arms races had begun. 19 
2. The emergence of a general staff 
When the Prussian army set off for Bohemia in June 1866, King 
William issued an order that was to make history. It decreed that "from 
now on my orders concerning the operational movements of the 
concentrated army and its individual parts shall be communicated to 
the commands through the chief of the general staff of the army. "20 
For the first time, a bureaucratic organization headed by a compara-
tively low-ranking officer'1 was officially authorized to issue binding 
orders to army and corps commanders in the king's stead. As a practi-
cal fact this was unique. Yet, as a concept, it was not entirely new. 
The shortest description of a modern general staff is to liken it to 
the brains and nerves of an army. The raw material of a general staff's 
work is information, the machinery is bureaucratic procedures, and the 
purpose is command and control.22 To grow from a bunch of incon-
spicuous traditions into the blueprint for a fine-tuned machinery, 
however, the concept of the modern general staff needed time. In 
Prussia, it did have that time. The general staff that led King William's 
armies to victory in 1866 and 1870/71 had perfected its skills and its 
procedures over more than 60 years. 
It is often assumed that Napoleon invented the general staff as 
such but as a bureaucratic institution it was first established in Prussia 
arou~d I 800. After the defeat of I 806/07, Scharnhorst transformed the 
embryonic organization into the first general staff along modern lines. 23 
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Every component later found to be characteristic of the concept was 
already there when the general staff was first put to the test in 1813. 
Schamhorst's staff consisted of a central organization, the Great 
General Staff, and the so-called Troop General Staff with the corps 
and divisions. So did Moltke's. Scharnhorst's staff was responsible for 
higher officer's training and for the Berlin War School, as Moltke's 
was for the War Academy which sprang from the latter. General staff 
officers in the Wars of Liberation were subordinate to their chief as 
well as to their respective commanders with the troops. That 
Sonderdienstweg (literally "special chain of command", probably better 
translated as "general staff channels") was also to assure Moltke 's grip 
on the armies and corps in 1866 and 1870/71. 
The list could be continued almost endlessly. Many of the less 
conspicuous occupations and working techniques of the general staff 
were introduced during the first two decades of the 19th century. The 
general staff produced military maps, it wrote military history and 
published military journals. It trained officers through general staff 
rides and Kriegsspiel (war game). It gathered information on foreign 
countries and armies. It prepared contingency war plans. It also 
cultivated a unique leadership technique called Fiihrung durch 
Direktiven (directive command) or more colloquially Auftragstaktik. 
Until the mid-eentury, four successive chiefs of staff by the names of 
Grolman, MUffling, Krauseneck, and Reyher worked on improving and 
refining the general staff's skills and methods within all those fields of 
action. Their achievement was not only to have produced a generation 
of staff officers who knew their profession inside out, among them 
Helmuth von Moltke, who joined the staff in 1832. Scharnhorst's 
disciples had also imbued an army which had hitherto been dominated 
by die-hard warriors of Marshal BlUcher's kind with an understanding 
and respect for the bureaucratic planning and rational decision-making 
processes represented in the general staff. 24 
Two things were new in the mid-eentury. Well into the 1850s, the 
general staff had not been concerned with mobilizing, concentrating 
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and deploying the army. These tasks had been performed by the war 
department. With the arrival of the railway, however, the time lag 
between mobilization order and completion of deployment shrank from 
2-3 months to 2-3 weeks. Armies now could gain a crucial advantage 
over the enemy by being the first to be ready. Consequently, mobiliza-
tion and deployment became more and more inseparable from the war 
plan. They passed from the sphere of army administration to the 
sphere of operational planning. Moreover, since the general staff was 
traditionally responsible for the evaluation of technical innovations, 
railways and telegraphs were its natural competence. It was in the 
logic of things that the general staff gradually assumed control over 
mobilization and deployment in the 1850s.25 
And finally the historic order of 2 June 1866. On the one hand, it 
was revolutionary. On the other, it was overdue. Since the Wars of 
Liberation, general staff officers with armies, corps, and divisions had 
been authorized, nay obliged, to issue orders in the name of their 
respective commanders. Every single one of them was expected to be 
the eyes and ears, the mouth and the right hand of the man in charge in 
order to relieve him from everything save the most fundamental deci-
sions." Yet the position of their chief was more humble. For one thing, 
he was not the only military advisor to the king; he shared that burden 
with the minister of war and the chief of the military cabinet. For 
another, his superior was not just some general, but the supreme 
commander-in-chief; the royal warlord bound to his army by mystic 
pre-modem ties, a mutual relationship so perfectly embodied in the 
king's title Oberster Kriegsherr that the latter defies translation." When 
King William entrusted Moltke with the same authority that his subordi-
nates had held at the corps and division levels for decades, he accepted 
the fact that in a modern war even Prussia 's soldier king could not do 
without professional support. For an officer who knew war only from 
behind a desk, the way was now free to rise to the "greatest captain of 
his age."28 
For most of the 19th century, Prussia's general staff was without 
DEFENCE STUDIES 2/2001 13 
peer. Before the Wars of German Unification, no other country had 
anything resembling the central bureaucratic institution Scharnhorst 
had created. The other powers either relied on staff corps which in 
case of war seconded aids to the commanders in the field but lacked 
any permanent central organization (France), 29 or buried their main 
staffs beneath the bureaucratic jungles of Byzantine war departments 
(Austria, Russia),'0 or had no staff at all (Great Britain, USA)." As the 
wars of 1866 and 1870/71 were to show, a modern general staff was 
no guarantee for prudent war plans and smooth operations, yet it 
facilitated them a lot. Prussia's army had an in-built advantage and it 
was to make the most of it. 
3. Railways and the military 
When the plans for the Potsdam to Berlin railway were drafted in the 
1830s, Frederick William IV moaned that he could see no real advan-
tage in arriving at his capital an hour earlier. His general staff, however, 
could. On an autumn day in 1839, 8,000 soldiers travelled from the 
Potsdam manoeuvre grounds to the Berlin garrisons on this very 
railway. And that was only the beginning. Thirty years later, in August 
1870, the Northern German Federation deployed an army 1.2 million 
strong at the Rhine within eleven days. That achievement was possible 
only through systematic use of the available railways. 
Admittedly, the general staff did not welcome the first railways with . 
genuine enthusiasm. Considering the poor engines and tiny coaches of 
the 1830s, it was all too obvious that the railway would not be able to 
carry significant numbers of troops over considerable distances in the 
near future. So the general staff pushed the expansion of the all-
weather-road network while carefully monitoring the potential of the 
new means of transportation. By the late 1840s, however, it was clear 
that the railway was no longer in its infancy. Troop transports became 
a common sight during the revolution of 1848/49 and were also em-
ployed for the mobilization of 1850. Yet, military use of the railway 
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was still a gigantic improvisation which consisted of little more than 
putting troops on regular trains running in accordance with the civilian 
schedule. It was a bare impossibility to move all of Prussia's nine army 
corps at one time this way and consequently Moltke 's predecessor as 
chief of staff, Car! von Reyher, still regarded the railway as a mere 
substitute for foot marches- admittedly welcome, but not to be relied 
upon. 
This judgement, however, kept neither the war department nor the 
general staff from working out the procedures that the army would 
need if it ever was to use the railway seriously. Regulations for military 
transports were issued. The war department kept statistics on the 
capacities of existing railways which were updated annually. It was 
decreed that all freight cars had to be fitted with the installations 
necessary for the transport of troops and horses. Army officers were 
trained in railway matters and troop transports became requisite ele-
ments of staff rides and corps manoeuvres. In co-operation with the 
department of commerce, which was responsible for the railways, the 
employment of trains for mobilization transports was planned in 
advance. Precautions were taken for the establishment of joint com-
missions of the two departments that were to administer the individual 
railway lines in war. By the 1850s, it became even a standing proce-
dure that the chief of the general staff was consulted before any new 
line was approved of. This was to ensure that it fitted the needs of the 
army." Actually, Reyher seldom objected and Moltke almost never. He 
thought that any new railway would automatically serve the needs of 
the army. Railway lines were inevitably built along the main axes of 
existing traffic, which by virtue of topographical facts were also the 
most likely routes of operations." 
The days were already dawning when the railway section would form 
the nerve centre of the Great General Staff and the meticulous drawing up 
of tight-knit transport schedules would appear as the very essence of staff 
work. But that was still only partially obvious when the army's railway 
complex was first put to the test in the Wars of Unification. 
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To be sure, its achievements were way ahead of those of its adver-
saries. Neither Austria nor France could even dream of deploying mass 
armies at their borders within days. France took pride in her closely-
knit railway network, which was among the finest in the world, far 
superior to Prussia 's, 34 but had failed to take any precautions for its 
military use. The result was a veritable disaster during the mobilization 
of 1870." Austria's preparations, in turn, had been exemplary, but of 
little use on a railway network which was so sparse that it featured 
only one single-track line into Bohemia by 1866.36 
Prussia had the right mix of careful preparation and a decent rail-
way network. In the wars of 1866 and 1870, she was able to deploy 
her army with considerable speed. A careful observer, however, would 
have noticed that the corps which set out for Paris on 3 August 1870 
consisted entirely of combat troops. For the sake of speed, all supply 
elements had been left behind to catch up with the fighting force as 
best as they could during the advance. That hope was of course 
illusory, as was the idea that the army would be able to make use of 
the French railway network for their supply. The task was beyond 
reach in 1870 as it would be in 1914. Once deployed, the army had to 
abandon the railway for good. Soldiers were to march and to live off 
the land as they had done from time immemorial and would continue to 
do so until the arrival of the combustion engine. 37 
4. Dreyse's gift: the needle gun 
When the Prussian army first took an interest in Johann Dreyse 's 
famous needle gun in the early 1830s, the reason was neither that it 
was rifled nor that it was breechloading. Instead, Frederick William lii 
and his generals were most impressed with the percussion lock, which 
made the gun much more reliable than its flintlock predecessors, 
especially in rainy weather. When the king ordered the first Dreyse 
guns for his army in 1839, he chose an earlier model, a muzzleloading 
smoothbore. In the following year, however, the war department could 
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convince the new king, Frederick William IV, of the extraordinary 
qualities the rifled breechloader had shown in the trials. Not only did 
rifling triple the effective range of the weapon. Due to its 
breechloading mechanism, it could also deliver five to seven shots a 
minute compared with the smoothbore's two. On the offensive, 
Dreyse 's breechloader would dramatically increase the firepower of the 
infantry. On the defensive, however, due to the fact that it could 
discharge ten times as much lead on the attacker as the musket, it 
would be almost invincible. 
Yet the young king who ordered 60,000 breechloaders to be pur-
chased over the next six years in 1840 was an ailing old man when 
finally all of his infantry was carrying needle guns in 1859. It took 
Prussia 's army two decades to get rid of the old musket. A whole 
number of reasons were responsible for that delay. First of all, 
Dreyse 's small factory was not able to deliver the gun in large num-
bers. The obvious solution would have been to expand the factory, if 
necessary with government aid, or to employ additional production 
sites. But Frederick William regarded the needle gun as a secret shock 
weapon and consequently confined its production to the tiny 
Thuringian factory that was both inconspicuous and easy to control. 
For the same reason, the initial 60,000 guns were stored in the Berlin 
arsenal. Only in I 848, they were issued to the troops in considerable 
numbers, and only in the 1850s, the production was increased by 
opening up additional factories. 
Another delaying factor was that the Dreyse gun was far from 
perfect. Many smaller teething troubles could be overcome over the 
years, but some major flaws remained. The fragile percussion needle 
was easily damaged which rendered the gun temporarily useless. The 
breechblock was leaking gas, which was not only dangerous for the 
shooter but also reduced the muzzle velocity. That in turn resulted in 
decreased range and in a high trajectory that complicated aiming. A 
veteran from the Franco-German war later reported that in one case in 
order to hit enemy infantry at the edge of a forest 600 meters away his 
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platoon was ordered to point their guns three meters over the tree-
tops." 
Neither problem occurred with the modern muzzle loading rifles 
which were introduced in the French army at the same time, most 
notably the famous Minie gun. Due to their high muzzle velocity and 
resulting flat trajectory their effective range was over 700 meters. 
Their simple, sturdy construction made them a good deal more reliable 
than the comparatively complex needle gun. And best of all: while the 
Dreyse gun was expensive, the Minie was not. The old musket could 
even be converted to the Minie system and rifled without much trou-
ble. In view of Prussia's financial restraints, the comparatively low 
cost of the Minie was one of the main reasons for the delayed univer-
sal introduction of the needle gun. As late as the Cri mean War, 
Frederick William IV and his generals seriously considered making the 
Minie the standard infantry weapon instead of the needle gun." 
Paradoxically, the most important reason for the reluctant adoption 
of Dreyse's breechloader was the ease with which it could be dis-
charged up to seven times a minute. Later a weapon's effectiveness 
would be measured above all by the amount oflead that could be 
poured on the enemy during a given time. Yet the early 19'h century had 
different standards. A not too small fraction of Frederick William 's 
officer corps regarded a rapid-firing gun as dangerous nonsense. For 
one thing, it was feared that the fire frequency of the needle gun would 
encourage the waste of ammunition. In fact, with the needle gun, 60 
rounds, the regular personal allowance of each rifleman, could be 
discharged within less than 15 minutes, thus rendering - so the 
dreaded vision - whole battalions useless or even inducing them to flee 
in panic. 
Furthermore, the early 19" century witnessed the final clash of two 
radically different tactical concepts, namely firepower versus shock. 
Since the revolutionary and Napoleonic armies had began to win battles 
by hurling densely packed masses of infantry at the enemy's lines 
without much firing, the bayonet charge was widely regarded not only 
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as heroic, but also as the only decisive solution of any engagement. 
Firepower, on the other hand, was looked upon as a non-decisive, 
protracted way of fighting, worthless as anything more than a mere 
prelude to the final push. And that prelude was the task of light troops, 
skirmishers and sharpshooters, not of regular infantry. 40 
From that point of view, arming musketeers, the heavy infantry of 
the line, with an expensive breechloading rifle was not only unneces-
sary but even dangerous. If the soldier would come to rely on the fire 
. of his gun, he might be reluctant to attack with cold steel and might 
thus endanger the concept of tactical shock. Sharpshooters, on the 
other hand, had even less need for a rapid-firing gun. They needed a 
precision weapon with superior range, and the needle gun was neither. 
That left the skirmishers, who were neither required to aim carefully, 
nor to charge with the bayonet (or so at least the theory ran). Every 
Prussian infantry regiment had one battalion of so-called FUsiliere, 
which were considered. as light infantry. They were the first to receive 
needle guns in 1848. 
Only when the street fighting of the revolution and the war in 
Southwest Germany in 1849 publicly revealed the brutal power of the 
rapid fire the needle gun could deliver, it was made official policy to 
provide the whole infantry with it. The production was increased 
during the I 850s, yet it took another decade until finally the last Mini<! 
gun was sorted out. By that time, most other armies had come to adopt 
rifles, yet only Prussia had breechloaders. The war of 1866 was the 
final test. Already after the first battles at the Bohemian border it was 
all too obvious that Prussia 's war department had backed the right 
horse when ordering the Dreyse gun. Austria's brave whitecoats fell in 
heaps under its rapid fire. 
At the same time, Prussia had also forfeited most of the advantage 
an earlier broad-scale adoption of Dreyse's then revolutionary design 
would have provided. In 1850, a Prussian army carrying needle guns 
would have made Frederick William IV master of Europe. In 1866, 
however, it was no longer a secret how to construct an effective 
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breechloader. Most armies had tested one model or another during the 
preceding years. Now they knew what to do, and the rest was only a 
question of time and money. The needle gun had given Prussia a 
considerable advantage in just one war. When the bluecoats took the 
field again four years later, their 20 year old rifle was no longer a 
match for the modern chassepot the French army had meanwhile 
ordered.41 Now they had to show that even a superior rifle did not 
automatically win a war." 
5. Infantry tactics unchanged 
Until well into the 19'' century, infantry tactics were uniformly based 
on very dense formations. In Frederick's times the rationale had been 
to compensate for the notorious inaccuracy of the flintlock musket by 
delivering a concentrated hail of bullets. Since Napoleon, the idea was 
to provide the bayonet charge with the irresistible power of a densely 
packed crowd of bodies. In the middle of the 19'' century, however, 
things began to change. The rifle raised the distance an attacker had to 
cross to come to grips with the defender from a few dozen to several 
hundred meters. Breechloaders tripled the amount of lead poured on 
the enemy during a given time. The higher muzzle velocity of the new 
rifles meant that its bullets caused more severe injuries than before. 
Furthermore, the artillery likewise increased its range by introducing 
rifles and its firepower in general with new grenades, shrapnel, and 
fuses. In other words: The chances any man standing upright had of 
surviving in the close combat zone of a battlefield were sharply drop-
ping." 
The consequences were obvious. Away with the shoulder-to-
shoulder formations which were such gorgeous targets. The troops 
had to disperse, they had to take cover, maybe even entrench. That 
almost completely ruled out the bayonet charge so favoured by the 
contemporaries; instead, firepower had to gain in importance. Rapid-
firing rifles required nothing less than a revolution in tactics. 
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After 1807, tactical reforms were top priority in the Prussian army. 
The Frederician firing line had been defeated by the Napoleonic combi-
nation of skirmisher action and bayonet charge. Accordingly, the army 
reformers made the densely packed battalion column the new standard 
attack formation of the infantry and added one Fusilier (skirmisher) 
battalion to every regiment. Furthermore, the third rank of each mus-
keteer (regular) battalion was also trained as skirmishers. They could 
be employed to prepare the bayonet charge with softening fire, al-
though that was optional." 
These tactics were appropriate for the age of the flintlock musket 
and enabled Prussia to meet the French army on equal terms in 1813-
14, unlike in 1806/07. In the age of rifles, however, using close-order 
formations like the battalion column was synonymous with inviting 
disaster. Yet for the rest of the 19'' century, the Prussian army never 
really managed to get rid of the legacy of 1813. The introduction of 
skirmishers was of course a step in the right direction. But instead of 
making light infantry tactics obligatory for the whole infantry, the 
Fusiliere were long regarded as special troops at best and as an 
anomaly at worst. 
Sometimes it is claimed that Prussia's infantry abandoned close 
order tactics with the infantry regulations of 184 7. That is a gross 
misunderstanding. To be sure, the regulations of 184 7 allowed the 
formation of company instead of battalion columns, and that chapter of 
the regulations was titled zerstreutes Gefecht, meaning open order." 
Yet one should be careful not to let oneself be fooled by terms. A 
Prussian company on war footing was 250 heads strong, rather the 
size of a small battalion for most other armies. 46 In other words, it was 
a most clumsy thing and still a genuine mass target. The use of 
skirmishers remained optional." Nobody even dared to think of field 
fortifications. 
Only in the 1850s, the first regulations for something resembling 
open order were passed." At the same time it became obvious to many 
officers that not all formations used on the parade ground would be 
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also useful in battle. It was difficult to imagine that a battalion in the 
field would ever employ the Achsschwenkung, a rotation of an extended 
line around its centre, like the vanes of a windmill," or other meticu-
lously drafted formations. Consequently, tactics by the book and 
"realistic" tactics began to drift apart. 50 In the Franco-German War, 
the elaborate succession of individual skirmishers, skirmish er groups, 
skirmisher platoons, and company columns in reserve (in order from 
front to rear) began to melt away under the realities of modern com-
bat. Increasingly, the close order formations in the rear, which were 
originally kept in reserve to execute the final push with the bayonet, 
were merely feeding the firing line with more and more skirmishers.51 
Many battles of the wars of 1866 and 1870/71, however, were also 
prime examples of tactics that had remained unchanged since 1813. At 
Gravelotte-St. Privat for instance, on 18 August 1870, the Prussian 
Guard charged uphill over open ground against fortified positions in 
perfect close order formations as if on parade. It lost 8,000 men out of 
28,000, or 29 per cent of its strength. 52 The fight was stuff for legends 
and it contributed to winning the battle. But like many other similar 
attacks during both wars, it was primarily evidence for the fact that 
Prussia's army had still one foot in the Napoleonic Wars." 
Yet so had other armies. The reasons why until well into the 1880s no 
great army could adapt its tactics to the age of rifles were the same within 
all military establishments of the time. It was commonplace that decisive-
ness was assured by the concentration of force, so to the minds of 
contemporaries dispersion meant sacrificing one's ability to strike a 
decisive blow. Dispersion also signified loss of control, yet control was 
necessary to upholding discipline and eo-coordinated action. Not least, 
dispersion required doing without the neatly arranged lines and columns of 
infantry, masses of cavalry, and rows of guns which altogether so per-
fectly embodied the might and glory of Europe's great powers. In other 
words: dispersion meant war without show. And that was bitter for the 
proud aristocratic officers of the 19th century. They all would have to learn 
their lesson the hard way in autumn 1914. 







Conclusion: The military revolution reconsidered 
Before I sum up, I must briefly mention some developments in other 
fields of military innovation. Prussia employed the telegraph in the 
field, but as late as the war of 1870 it did not work very well and 
certainly not better than in most other armies. 54 The introduction of 
rifled cannon was even slower than that of rifled small arms and this 
' 
in spite of the fact that Krupp, the leading manufacturer of rifled steel 
barrels, was a Prussian citizen. The Prussian artillery went to war in 
1866 with badly inferior equipment. To be sure, they learned their 
lesson and managed to catch up with the other powers until 1870.55 
Cavalry tactics were as anachronistic in the Prussian army as in any 
other. Until 1914 the cavalry relied on the shock effect of massed 
charges, which was already as hopeless against breechloading rifles as 
it would later be against machine guns'' 
After the disaster of 1806/07, the promotion of officers on the 
bases of knowledge and performance rather than of aristocratic birth 
was established. The educational requirements for officer candidates 
were raised every few years. Since 1844, the entrance qualification for 
the Prima, the last two years of the Gymnasium, was necessary to he 
allowed to the first exams. For the admittance to the final exams, two 
years at officer school or the entrance qualification for the university 
were required. There remained loopholes, however. Cadets were 
allowed to take the exams without formal qualification. Royal favour 
could also earn commissions. Not least, further promotion of officers 
was not subject to proof of any achievements. On average, however, 
Prussian officers were probably better educated than their foreign 
colleagues. Whether that made them better tacticians or leaders is hard 
to decide. 57 
To sum up, there was no military revolution in Prussia before the 
Wars of Unification. The so-<:alled reform of 1859/60 was primarily an 
attempt at closing the gap between the Prussian and the larger conti-
nental armies through an increase in annual recruiting. With regard to 
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the Landwehr, the reform was only the final step of a transformation 
process that had began in 1819. Nothing could have been less revolu-
tionary. The general staff of 1866 and 1870/71 looked back upon two 
generations of steady and professional improvement. Moltke was much 
less the shaper than a product of the system. Railways were monitored 
and employed in accordance with their increasing capabilities for 
military use. The professionalization of the officer corps had been a 
continuous process that began in 1807. In the fields of weaponry and 
tactics, however, the Prussian army was a slow learner. It failed to 
make early use of the gift the Dreyse gun could have been and turned 
to Krupp cannon much later than necessary. Its tactics were never 
really adapted to the age of rifles. All in all, any improvement that 
occurred between the Wars of Liberation and the Wars of Unification 
took the shape of continuous progress, not of dramatic punctual 
changes. 
Compared with its potential adversaries, the Prussian army had 
managed to keep pace on most fields and to gain certain advantages on 
some. Does that suffice to explain its victory in the Wars of Unifica-
tion? Hardly, I think. I will for a moment forget the inconvenient fact 
that the outcome of any major war between powers of comparable 
military strength is by definition subject to the combined influence of 
hundreds of different factors and a good deal of contingency. Rather, I 
will look into some of the fields of military innovation mentioned in this 
article. 
The high recruiting quota introduced in 1860 did nothing more than 
allow Prussia to play the game at all. It did not provide William's 
armies with any numerical superiority to which victory could be 
attributed." The needle gun was not alone responsible for victory in 
1866, or else France should have won in 1870. The firepower of the 
Dreyse did, however, increase the Austrian casualties in a way as to be 
absolutely detrimental to the whitecoats' morale. Still they fought on. 
The tactics of the Prussian army were hardly any better than those of 
the Austrian and French empires, and they were somehow inferior to 
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the tactics of the French republic in the winter of 1870/71. The sol-
diers of the republic were better at employing artillery barrages and 
open order. 
The obvious Prussian advantages were the effective use of railways 
for mobilization and above all a professional general staff. Even that 
did not save William 's generals from committing grave operational 
mistakes. Yet where Prussian commanders made mistakes, French and 
Austrian commanders were frequently responsible for outright blunder. 
In the end, however, both the war of 1866 and that of 1870/71 were 
decided by moral and political factors. Due to internal problems, 
Austria admitted defeat after the battle of Sad ova. At that time, its field 
army was still intact, if shaken." The late French empire, on the other 
hand, was increasingly unpopular and therefore unable to command the 
unbroken loyalty of its soldiers. Consequently, there were first signs of 
dissolution already after the battles at the borders. The armies of the 
republic were no real match even for Prussia's ymmg conscripts, since 
they lacked decent training. As the war dragged on in winter 1870/71, 
war-weariness overwhelmed most of them and finally the field forces 
of the republic disintegrated." In many a sense it will therefore be fair 
to admit that Prussia did not win the Wars of Unification, but much 
rather her enemies lost them. 
The recurrent myth - some hypotheses 
In spite of all the facts presented in this article, the myth of Prussia 's 
military revolution could arise. One need not wonder that is still alive. 
The political history of the pre-unification era has always taken the 
military "facts" for granted, and German military historians have up to 
now not concerned themselves with this period. Everything seemed 
just so plainly obvious. Yet, as we have seen, it was not. 
Myths do not simply arise without function. They are constructed 
to serve a certain purpose. As a conclusion, I will offer some hypoth-
eses on the function of the myths around the army reform of 1859/60. 
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First. As I have tried to show at the start, Prussia 's victory in 1866 
came as a surprise to most contemporaries and caused a search for 
explanations. Declaring the reorganization to have been the prime 
reason for victory was convenient for everyone, but especially for 
William, Bismarck, and Roon, who could use this simple argument to 
outmanoeuvre the opposition. The second victory in 1871, though not 
nearly as surprising as the first, further substantiated that convenient 
theory. 
Second. The dramatic conflict that the so-<:alled reform had trig-
gered made the latter look much more significant in retrospect than it 
had originally been. After six years of bitter fighting the technical 
details had become dogma anyway. It appeared now, that without 
doubt the reform must have been a vital question for the state or how 
else could the protracted deadlock of the political system be justified? 
Moreover, the bitter debates on constitutional matters during the 
conflict had direct repercussions on many central aspects of the 
constitution of the Northern German Federation (1867) and the Second 
Empire (1871). The compromise that had solved the conflict had 
likewise largely anticipated the political balance of power of the new 
empire. 61 That the confusing twists and turns of the pre-unification 
years had finally resulted in two glorious victories and national unifica-
tion attached prime importance to them. In retrospect, the historical 
sequence of events that had led to 1871 became the only possible and 
legitimate way German history could have taken. Accordingly, every 
event on this way acquired the character of a symbol carved in stone. 
And army reform was a central event in this historical sequence. 
Third. The Second Empire was not so stable and uniform a state as 
it appeared on the map. On the contrary, unification had concealed 
many internal conflicts as well as social and regional cleavages instead 
of solving them. The new empire was also a stumbling stone for the 
concert of European powers. In order to underpin its stability and 
legitimacy, it needed integrative symbols and legends. 
Fortunately, the leadership of the empire contained some figures 
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who qualified more or less as heroic symbols of victorious internal and 
external battles. With the exception of Helmuth von Moltke, who 
advanced to become "the greatest captain of his age," they had all been 
protagonists of army reform and constitutional conflict. William I, now 
Emperor, had initiated the military reorganization and had triggered the 
conflict through his stubborn refusal to compromise. Roon had drafted 
the plans and defended the reform before the legislature. Bismarck, the 
"iron chancellor," had built his political career on defending the king's 
will to the last. Now these three men became the father figures of the 
new nation state. Roon died already in 1879, but William lived on until 
1888, when he died at the age of 90, a beloved old man with a magnifi-
cent white beard. Finally there was Bismarck, who stood at the helm 
of the new empire for almost 20 years. When he died in 1898 at the 
age of 83, he was widely (though not generally) regarded as almost 
superhuman, a man who seemed too large even for his dramatic time. 
Once these men were styled the heroes of the Second Empire, their 
biographies became automatically historically sacrosanct. Whatever 
they had done, especially in the period immediately before unification, 
must by definition have been not only legitimate, but necessary. 
Fourth. In order to emphasise the immense importance of the 
events that had led to unification and the great service the aforemen-
tioned heroes had rendered their country, it was necessary to paint the 
period before as gloomily as possible. The timing was no problem. 
William had become acting representative of his ailing brother in 1857, 
regent in 1858 and king in 1861. He had appointed Moltke in 1858, 
Roon in 1859, and Bismarck in 1862. It was easy to construct Prus-
sian history until 1857 as a period of weak foreign policy, permanent 
crisis and above all neglect of the army, even more since it featured the 
embarrassing events of the revolution in 1848 and the diplomatic defeat 
at the hands of Austria in 1850. From this dark background, the heroes 
of the unification period could rise like shimmering stars. They had 
saved the country from its mediocre existence and made it a great 
power again. 62 
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The myth of military revolution was thus a necessary function of the 
attempt to effectively contrast a gloomy past with a shining present 
during the Second Empire. Accordingly, the period between 1813 and 
1857 was constructed as a time of permanent neglect of the army. 
That is how the reorganization of 1859/60 became "the glorious resto-
ration of the army" and was merged with several other factors into one 
secular break, a true military revolution. 63 
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